Regarding Keith Parsons: On Meaning and Punishment

In 1998 AD a debate entitled "Why I Am/Am Not A Christian" took place between William Lane Craig and Keith Parsons at Prestonwood Baptist Church-Dallas, Texas (hear here part I & part II).

This was a very interesting and lively debate. Parsons made many odd and fallacious statements. For example, he committed the ad hominem in referring to "Christian" crusades, witch hunts, etc. while, of course, utterly ignoring atheism's likewise actions. On numerous occasions his arguments boiled down to him quite literally yelling "I cannot believe." The argument from personal incredulity is useful for getting people emotionally involved and sympathetic to your point of view but is no way to convince the rational mind. What Parsons is capable, willing, or able to believe has no bearing whatsoever on what is true and what is not.

Keith Parsons and William Lane Craig

In this essay I wish to focus on two of his statements: his exaltation of the meaningfulness of a finite life over an infinite life and his rejection of retributive punishment.

The Span of Our Lives:
Being careful to no fall into an ad hominem myself, I found it very disquieting that Parsons quotes Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) to support his contention that a finite life is more meaningful than an infinite one. I suppose that being a Nazi sympathizer, as Heidegger was, would certainly count as somehow meaningful since the Nazi movement certainly had it own peculiar effect on millions of people (meaning being purely subjective in Parsons' view).
Heidegger was the Nazi rector of the University of Freidburg in 1933 and "delivered an inaugural address which, fortunately for him, is not widely read."1 When he was 44 years of age he had an affair with Hannah Arendt who was one of his 18 year old students. This surely was fulfilling, in its own peculiar way.

I am not exactly certain what to make of the "My life span (finite or infinite) is more meaningful than yours" argument. But what has prompted me to comment on this issue is the fact that atheists very often make this argument. Parsons argued that a finite one is more meaningful because each moment is precious since it is going, going and finally gone. Thus, we must do what we can while we can.

Fair enough.

However, it is perhaps because it is finite that it is ultimately fleeting and ultimately meaningless. No matter what one does, for oneself or for others, it will come to absolute nothingness.

On the other hand, an infinite life may be said to have more meaning since, as with the finite concept, each passing moment is going, going and finally gone but will have eternal consequences of some sort. Perhaps it is because of its infinite repercussions that an infinite life has more meaning both immediately and ultimately.

No Punishment Intended:
At one hour, nineteen minutes and nineteen seconds into the debate Parsons made the following statement:

He [Dr. Craig] said further that sin must be punished. Why? Why? Uh, why must sin be punished? Why, why is it good, what good would it do for Hitler and Stalin to be suffering torment right now? What good would it do? Why? I mean, what good does it do that just because someone has committed a terrible atrocious act why then inflict pain upon them after the act has been done? Why do we have punishment? We have punishment because we want to keep people from doing terrible things. That's why we have punishment. A purely retributive idea of punishment is barbarous.

There are many concepts and fallacies wrapped up in this little comment. Let us begin with the bottom line which is that sin in general and the committing of terrible atrocious acts in particular should not be punished.

Let us apply Parsons' concept broadly and see what happens: someone breaks into a home and proceeds to rape, torture, murder, dismember and cannibalize an entire family. We individuals, or society, or the government, or God should do absolutely nothing. This is, according to Parsons' reasoning, because purely retributive punishment is barbarous. Thus, it would do not good if Hitler and Stalin were suffering torment right now. I certainly hope that I am misunderstanding Parsons' worldview. I certainly hope that I am mischaracterizing and misapplying his statements. However, his statements are so convoluted and fallacious that I fear that I am spot on.

Logically, punishment comes after crime. Parsons claims that "We have punishment because we want to keep people from doing terrible things." Yet, we punish them after they have committed the crime.
But perhaps it is the concept of punishment that is supposed to dissuade them from committing crime in the first place.
We must now not only ask, "What if it does not dissuade?" but point out the fact that while it does dissuade many it also does not dissuade many. But what is to happen to those who are not dissuaded? Apparently, nothing. But if no punishment is meted out to the un-dissuaded then there is no punishment, conceptual or actual, to dissuade anyone. If punishment is not dealt out it becomes nullified as a deterrent.

In our essay Dan Barker and the Alien Rape Voyeurs we pointed out that Dan Barker holds to a likewise concept regarding crime and non-punishment. Dan Barker contends that we do not incarcerate people in order to punish them for their crime but in order to protect ourselves from them. However, consider a person who committed one murder, or one rape, or one robbery: what are we protecting ourselves from? We cannot merely assume that a onetime murdered will murder again, can we justly keep someone in jail from years or decades on our guess that they may still be a danger? If we are not punishing them for their crime then we ought to release them. Indeed, quite logically our system of justice serves both purposes: to punish and to protect society.

Please take a moment to note that the fact of suffering in the world is one of the best reasons for rejecting atheism. Consider that on the atheist view Hitler and Stalin are most certainly not suffering. In fact, on the atheist view the evil and suffering caused by Hitler and Stalin were not, as one would suppose, purposeless.

I do not here merely mean that, theologically speaking, there may be some ultimate purpose or that something good could come out of it. Moreover, note very carefully that the point that I am about to make is not one that an atheist would make. That is not my point. My point is to draw a logical conclusion.

What I meant is that on the atheist view the evil and suffering wrought by Hitler and Stalin were very purposeful and beneficial-for Hitler and Stalin. The evil and suffering that they caused served to cause them pleasure and this is the ultimate purpose-the evildoers got to enjoy themselves. Understand that on the atheist view they committed their actions and will not suffer divine retribution. As long as they escaped the judicious systems of the temporal world, they got away with it.

For example, Hitler enjoyed his power, had thousands of adoring adherents, did as he pleased, and when he decided it was time to end it all-he did so. He did not go on to face divine judgment but went on to complete annihilation, a sort of perfect peace by which one simply ceases to be. On the atheist view this is not only true of Hitler and Stalin escaping judgment but is also true of the saintliest of saints who may have spent a lifetime of selflessness-they too disappear into absolute nothingness.

Thus, having admitted and hoped that we have misunderstood Parsons' statement regarding punishment we have answered it at face value as he stated it and with the whole debate as context.

Ultimately, it appears that sometimes in our haste to counter argue we are too quite on the draw and end up making fallacious statement that one end up digging a deeper grave for our world views.

1. 1. Existentialism: Kaufmann Philosophy to Kierkegaard Theology, p. 47